Qubole AWS cross-account role abuse: stolen vendor credentials used to raid customer AWS accounts; Expedia confirms supply-chain breach
SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.
What happened
Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, reported that a threat actor used IAM credentials from AWS account 805246085872, which Qubole's data platform uses to reach customer environments, to assume the integration roles customers had created to trust Qubole, between October 14 and October 26, 2026. Every AssumeRole call carried the correct External ID and succeeded; most of the roles were dormant, left in place after companies stopped using Qubole. Calls came from Mullvad VPN exits and an OVH VPS, never from Qubole's own AWS infrastructure, using role session names starting with quiam-. Inside each account the actor enumerated S3, EC2, RDS, KMS and IAM, pulled secrets from Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda environment variables and EC2 user data, validated stolen AWS, Entra ID and Okta credentials with TruffleHog, and downloaded S3 data, in some cases whole buckets and production database backups (Sentra saw zero write actions). Wiz also found a bootable sso_agent.iso on the attacker's server but has not seen it deployed. An extortion actor calling itself n0n has claimed the intrusion. On November 12, Expedia Group confirmed attackers reached its systems through a compromised third-party data platform provider; it has not named the vendor or said what data was exposed, and researchers have not named Expedia as a Qubole victim. n0n's claim of nearly one billion Expedia traveler records is unverified.
Who's affected
Any organization that ever onboarded Qubole and still has an IAM role trusting account 805246085872 (current or former customers), and anyone whose secrets were readable by such a role. Expedia Group has confirmed a breach via an unnamed data platform provider. Separately, Wiz saw customer-owned AWS access keys created for Qubole integrations tested on October 8 to 11, with a few environments compromised.
✅ Fix / patch
- Find every IAM role whose trust policy allows arn:aws:iam::805246085872:root (or any principal in that account): aws iam list-roles --query "Roles[?contains(to_string(AssumeRolePolicyDocument), '805246085872')].RoleName" in every account. Delete roles you no longer use, or remove Qubole from the trust policy.
- If a role was assumed by the actor: rotate every secret, SSM parameter, Lambda environment variable, EC2 user-data credential, and any AWS/Entra ID/Okta credential that role could read; revoke active sessions for the role (rotating a credential does not end temporary sessions already issued).
- For integrations you keep, replace the :root principal with the vendor's specific IAM principal and add aws:SourceIp or aws:SourceVpce conditions pinned to the vendor's published ranges. Treat External IDs as non-secret and rotate them with the vendor.
- Turn on an organization CloudTrail for all accounts and regions and S3 data events or server access logs for sensitive buckets; without them you cannot see which objects were read.
- Block or alert on the published IPs, and on any vendor-account AssumeRole from a VPN or hosting provider the vendor has never used.
🔎 Quick hunt check
Wiz published account, principal, session-name, IP and user-agent indicators (below). In CloudTrail from October 1, 2026, in every account holding an integration role, look for: AssumeRole where userIdentity.accountId is 805246085872 and sourceIPAddress is not an AWS address; any activity by principal AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS (actor-only); AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW from a non-AWS IP (it also carries legitimate traffic); role session names starting quiam-; any event from the listed IPs; and GetCallerIdentity with a TruffleHog user agent alongside those IPs (check Entra ID and Okta sign-in logs for TruffleHog too). For each session found, follow it into Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda and S3. Mullvad exit IPs and the listed boto3/aws-cli user agents are shared, so treat them as evidence only together with another indicator.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1199, T1078.004, T1580, T1552.001, T1555.006, T1530, T1087.004
IOCs
- IP addresses:
57.129.54[.]120,2001:41d0:70d[:]7800:: (OVH),45.83.220[.]211,185.209.199[.]73,89.37.63[.]175 - SHA-256 hashes:
sso_agent.iso SHA-256 65f061281c9a712e9502793dc4c5035cae490b84da05f7d4223cefa65ad396e4 - Files / paths:
AWS account 805246085872 (Qubole platform account; also legitimate),IAM principal AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS (actor-only),IAM principal AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW (actor from Oct 18; also legitimate from AWS IPs),Role session names quiam-* (e.g. quiam-enum, quiam-scope-full),User agent TruffleHog (GetCallerIdentity, Entra ID sign-ins),sso_agent.iso polls 57.129.54[.]120 on TCP 23458
All indicators from Wiz CIRT's published IOC tables. Three addresses are Mullvad VPN exits and the OVH IP may be reassigned, so vet hits in context; the boto3/aws-cli user agents Wiz lists are common and only count alongside another indicator.
Hunt queries
Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.
```Qubole cross-account role abuse (Oct 14-26, 2026): Wiz-published account, principals, quiam- sessions, IPs, TruffleHog```
index=* sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail earliest=10/01/2026:00:00:00
("805246085872" OR "AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS" OR "AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW" OR "quiam-" OR sourceIPAddress IN ("57.129.54.120","45.83.220.211","185.209.199.73","89.37.63.175") OR sourceIPAddress="2001:41d0:70d:7800:*" OR userAgent="*TruffleHog*")
| eval acct='userIdentity.accountId', principal='userIdentity.principalId', arn='userIdentity.arn', session='requestParameters.roleSessionName'
| eval ip_is_ioc=if(match(sourceIPAddress,"^(57\.129\.54\.120|45\.83\.220\.211|185\.209\.199\.73|89\.37\.63\.175|2001:41d0:70d:7800:)"),1,0)
| eval signal=case(
principal="AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS", "actor_only_principal",
match(coalesce(session,""),"^quiam-") OR match(coalesce(arn,""),"/quiam-"), "quiam_session",
ip_is_ioc=1, "ioc_ip",
eventName="AssumeRole" AND acct="805246085872" AND NOT match(sourceIPAddress,"(?i)amazonaws|^AWS Internal$"), "vendor_assumerole_check_ip",
eventName="GetCallerIdentity" AND like(userAgent,"%TruffleHog%"), "trufflehog_key_validation",
true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(eventName) as events values(sourceIPAddress) as src_ips values(session) as sessions values(requestParameters.roleArn) as roles by recipientAccountId
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
```vendor_assumerole_check_ip rows: confirm whether each src IP is AWS-owned; Wiz saw all legitimate Qubole traffic come from AWS infrastructure. Follow every quiam- session into GetSecretValue, GetParameter, GetFunctionConfiguration and GetObject.```// Qubole cross-account role abuse (Oct 14-26, 2026): Wiz-published indicators in AWSCloudTrail
let Since = datetime(2026-10-01);
let IocIPs = dynamic(["57.129.54.120","45.83.220.211","185.209.199.73","89.37.63.175"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= Since
| extend Session = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).roleSessionName)
| extend Signal = case(
UserIdentityPrincipalid == "AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS", "actor_only_principal",
Session startswith "quiam-" or UserIdentityArn has "/quiam-", "quiam_session",
SourceIpAddress in (IocIPs) or SourceIpAddress startswith "2001:41d0:70d:7800:", "ioc_ip",
EventName == "AssumeRole" and UserIdentityAccountId == "805246085872" and SourceIpAddress !has "amazonaws" and SourceIpAddress != "AWS Internal", "vendor_assumerole_check_ip",
EventName == "GetCallerIdentity" and UserAgent has "TruffleHog", "trufflehog_key_validation",
"")
| where isnotempty(Signal)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Signals = make_set(Signal), EventNames = make_set(EventName, 50), SourceIPs = make_set(SourceIpAddress, 20), Sessions = make_set(Session, 20) by RecipientAccountId
| order by Events desc
// Also check SigninLogs / AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs and Okta logs for a TruffleHog user agent from the same IPs⏱ CISA deadline
Not in CISA KEV as of Nov 18, 2026.
Sources
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