← All playbooks
HighSupply chain · 2026-11-15

Cursor Claude Code extension 2.1.312/2.1.313 backdoor: breach via Fireworks AI key led to malicious marketplace build

SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.

What happened

Cursor published an incident report on Friday, November 13, 2026 explaining how its October 29 malicious-extension incident happened. An attacker obtained an access key Cursor had issued to its AI provider Fireworks AI, copied coding-agent traces (mostly from 2025, sessions not in Privacy Mode) from a shared storage bucket, and used unredacted credentials in those traces to reach select Cursor SaaS tools. From there they took archived non-production source repositories, limited support data and emails, usage metrics and contact details, some agent-conversation summaries, and credentials users had sent to support. With a stolen credential, the attacker placed malicious copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension (versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, Windows and macOS) on the cache serving Cursor's VS Code extension marketplace for about 11 hours on October 29. The build collects host details, adds an attacker SSH key labeled svc-telemetry, tries to enable SSH and open a reverse SSH tunnel, and sets up persistence. Cursor says up to 5,000 users may have received it, the attacker server is offline, and the last attacker activity it saw was November 1 (blocked). Anthropic's own extension and Open VSX were not affected. Uber separately disclosed driver data stolen through the same Fireworks AI compromise.

Who's affected

Developers who installed or updated Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor VS Code Extension Marketplace on macOS or Windows between about 2:27 AM and 1:35 PM PT on October 29, 2026, plus Cursor customers whose credentials appeared in non-Privacy-Mode agent traces or were shared with Cursor support (Cursor says it emailed team admins the specific keys to rotate).

✅ Fix / patch

  • Check every developer Mac and Windows machine for the attacker key: grep for svc-telemetry in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (Windows: %USERPROFILE%\.ssh\authorized_keys and C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys).
  • If found, isolate the host, collect evidence, then run Cursor's remediate-macos.sh (as the affected user) or remediate-windows.ps1 (elevated) from the security notice. Uninstalling the extension alone does not remove the standalone persistence scripts.
  • Remove the LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond (macOS) or the SysMon scheduled task and Startup sysmon.cmd fallback (Windows) after confirming what each one runs, and kill ssh/autossh reverse-tunnel processes. Decide whether to rebuild the host.
  • From a trusted system, rotate credentials and sessions reachable from affected hosts, and rotate any keys Cursor told your team admin about. Turn on Cursor Privacy Mode if your policy requires it.

🔎 Quick hunt check

Cursor published indicators: attacker endpoint 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 (reverse SSH as tunnel@ on TCP 22, HTTP POST beacon on port 8099), the svc-telemetry SSH key, VSIX hashes, persistence names and command lines. Hunt endpoint, network and extension-install telemetry back to October 29. Note names like SysMon or sysmon.cmd can collide with legitimate monitoring tools, so check what each startup object actually runs before removing it.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1552.001, T1082, T1098.004, T1572, T1053.005, T1543.001, T1547.001

IOCs

  • IP addresses: 134[.]209[.]82[.]225
  • Files / paths: VSIX 2.1.312 darwin-arm64 SHA-256 fcbb327e38e61c4fec795e0d0591f52cd1014b813d20a5912104953c3a17c364, VSIX 2.1.312 win32-x64 SHA-256 3de1722901165769893bef57c72594e9a54459faa23f3091b136b79966edd081, 2.1.313 SHA-256 ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15, SSH key comment svc-telemetry (fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk), ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist (macOS), %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd, %USERPROFILE%\.config\smtk, %TEMP%\.stk_<10 hex> (Windows), Scheduled task SysMon; Startup folder sysmon.cmd (Windows)

IOCs from Cursor's security notice (updated Oct 30, 2026). Beacon: hxxp://134[.]209[.]82[.]225:8099/beacon (HTTP POST). Lookups to ifconfig[.]me / api[.]ipify[.]org are legitimate and not an indicator on their own. Cursor says the attacker server is offline.

Hunt queries

Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.

index=* (sourcetype=*sysmon* OR sourcetype=*WinEventLog* OR sourcetype=*edr* OR sourcetype=*osquery* OR sourcetype=*crowdstrike* OR sourcetype=*firewall* OR sourcetype=*proxy*) earliest=10/29/2026:00:00:00
("134.209.82.225" OR "svc-telemetry" OR "com.apple.sysmond" OR "/tn SysMon" OR "smt.cmd" OR "smtk" OR "sysmon.cmd" OR "*:0:localhost:22" OR "autossh -M 0" OR "setremotelogin on" OR "OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0" OR "anthropic.claude-code-2.1.312" OR "anthropic.claude-code-2.1.313" OR "fcbb327e38e61c4fec795e0d0591f52cd1014b813d20a5912104953c3a17c364" OR "3de1722901165769893bef57c72594e9a54459faa23f3091b136b79966edd081" OR "ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15")
| eval indicator=case(searchmatch("134.209.82.225"),"attacker_ip", searchmatch("svc-telemetry"),"attacker_ssh_key", searchmatch("claude-code-2.1.31"),"malicious_extension_version", searchmatch("fcbb327e OR 3de17229 OR ecb58cb2"),"malicious_vsix_hash", searchmatch("localhost:22 OR autossh"),"reverse_ssh_tunnel", true(),"persistence_or_ssh_enable")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(indicator) as indicators values(sourcetype) as sources by host
| sort - count
// Cursor marketplace malicious Claude Code 2.1.312/2.1.313: Cursor-published network, key, hash, persistence and tunnel IOCs
let AttackerIP = "134.209.82.225";
let BadHashes = dynamic(["fcbb327e38e61c4fec795e0d0591f52cd1014b813d20a5912104953c3a17c364", "3de1722901165769893bef57c72594e9a54459faa23f3091b136b79966edd081", "ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15"]);
let Since = datetime(2026-10-29);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where RemoteIP == AttackerIP | extend Indicator = "attacker_ip", Evidence = strcat(RemoteIP, ":", RemotePort, " ", InitiatingProcessCommandLine)),
(DeviceFileEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where SHA256 in (BadHashes) or FolderPath has_any ("anthropic.claude-code-2.1.312", "anthropic.claude-code-2.1.313") or FileName in~ ("com.apple.sysmond.plist", "smt.cmd", "smtk", "sysmon.cmd") | extend Indicator = "file_artifact", Evidence = FolderPath),
(DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("svc-telemetry", "/tn SysMon", "setremotelogin on", "OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0", "autossh -M 0", "*:0:localhost:22") | extend Indicator = "process", Evidence = ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Indicators = make_set(Indicator), Evidence = make_set(Evidence, 20) by DeviceName
| order by Hits desc
// Cursor marketplace malicious Claude Code 2.1.312/2.1.313: Cursor-published network, key, hash, persistence and tunnel IOCs

See all hunt queries →

⏱ CISA deadline

Not in CISA KEV as of Nov 18, 2026.

Sources

Related playbooks

Get the SockAnalyst Weekly Brief free, every Thursday.

One email a week with the KEV deadlines, patches and hunt queries that matter. New playbooks still post here on the site every morning.

Subscribe free

Read the free weekly pack →