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HighSupply chain · 2026-11-17

Optimizely Web Experimentation supply-chain attack: signup-flow flaw let an attacker plant a card skimmer, crypto clipper and iOS exploit kits in 188 snippets at 178 orgs

SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.

What happened

On November 16, 2026, an attacker wrote malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects. Each customer site loads its project as a snippet from cdn.optimizely.com, so the tampered code was served from Optimizely's own trusted host with its own certificate. Scott Helme of Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax and Air France-KLM; Optimizely's own sites carried it too. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC (BBC snippet); the loader pulled 1688360[.]cc/track.js, in plain form, hidden in base64 via atob(), or as an inline copy run through eval if the domain was blocked. The payload swapped crypto wallet addresses in page text, forms and the clipboard, skimmed card number/expiry/CVV typed into a site's own form fields (not hosted payment iframes such as Stripe) and sent them to 1688360[.]cc/card.php, sent non-HttpOnly cookies and page screenshots to 1688360[.]cc/hit.php, and on iPhones and iPads loaded the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Attacker wallets received about $7,000. Mass cleanup started around 20:40 UTC and Report URI saw every infected file clean by 23:11 UTC. Optimizely confirmed an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow; it says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts and notified affected customers. The affected companies' own systems and code were not breached: they loaded a trusted third-party script that was altered upstream. Report URI and Optimizely both describe the injection as happening inside Optimizely projects, not on the customers' servers.

Who's affected

Organizations using Optimizely Web Experimentation whose projects were altered (Optimizely says it notified all affected customers; Report URI published the 178-organization list). Visitors who used an affected site on November 16, 2026, especially anyone who copied a crypto address, typed card details into the site's own form, or browsed on an iPhone/iPad below iOS 18.7.3 (or 26.x below 26.3). Corporate fleets whose users browsed those sites that day.

✅ Fix / patch

  • If you run Optimizely Web: open the Project JavaScript of every project and the custom code of every experiment and look for 1688360, atob( or any script you did not write. Searching only for the domain misses the base64 variant. Check snippets you serve from your own domain too.
  • Review every user, API token and integration with write access to your Optimizely account and rotate their credentials, even though Optimizely says it revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts.
  • If your own forms take card data, treat cards entered on November 16 as possibly exposed; rotate session tokens or secrets kept in non-HttpOnly cookies.
  • Deploy a Content Security Policy with a strict script-src and connect-src and turn on reporting. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com does not help, and 'strict-dynamic' or 'unsafe-eval' let this payload run on some sites.
  • Block the published domains (including subdomains) at proxy/DNS, and push iOS/iPadOS 18.7.3+ or 26.3+ to managed iPhones and iPads.
  • Users: double-check any crypto transfer made on Nov 16, watch card statements if you paid by card on an affected site.

🔎 Quick hunt check

Report URI published the attacker domains, three kit IPs, payload markers and track.js hashes (below). Hunt proxy, DNS, firewall, EDR network and CSP violation-report logs from November 13 (to cover the earlier webshell[.]lol wave via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts) for any of them. A request to card.php or hit.php means a browser on your network sent data out. On iOS fleets, repeated page reloads every 60 seconds on iOS 18.6 or earlier were a visible symptom of the exploit retry loop.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1189, T1059.007, T1056.003, T1565.002, T1539, T1113, T1041

IOCs

  • IP addresses: 136.113.106[.]136, 34.96.213[.]201, 34.87.36[.]58
  • Domains: 1688360[.]cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, webshell[.]lol, linkforge[.]cc, je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu, ios-hack[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu
  • Files / paths: URLs: hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js (payload), /card.php (card exfil), /hit.php (cookies + screenshot), /html2canvas.min.js, track.js SHA-256 814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f (17:13 UTC build), track.js SHA-256 f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 (17:57 UTC build), Page globals window._k7 / window.__k7b; script attribute data-channel-code="02111110"; Coruna telemetry channel BIGNIAO, Attacker wallets (Report URI): BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW; ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e; TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa; LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5

All IOCs from Report URI's published write-up (domains attacker-owned, block including subdomains). 1688360[.]cc and webshell[.]lol were put on clientHold on Nov 17 and no longer resolve; kit IPs are cloud-hosted and may be reassigned, so vet hits in context.

Hunt queries

Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.

index=* earliest=11/13/2026:00:00:00
(sourcetype=*proxy* OR sourcetype=*dns* OR sourcetype=*firewall* OR sourcetype=pan:* OR sourcetype=zscaler* OR sourcetype=*csp* OR sourcetype=*sysmon* OR sourcetype=*edr*)
("1688360.cc" OR "5vobauua3ojpklx.icu" OR "eil786npto9u5bq.icu" OR "l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu" OR "webshell.lol" OR "linkforge.cc" OR "je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu" OR "q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu" OR "ios-hack.icu" OR "p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu" OR "1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu" OR "gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu" OR "136.113.106.136" OR "34.96.213.201" OR "34.87.36.58" OR "window._k7" OR "__k7b" OR "02111110" OR "BIGNIAO")
| eval dest_host=lower(coalesce(query, dest_host, url_domain, dest, http_host, site, url, blocked_uri, _raw))
| eval signal=case(match(dest_host,"1688360\.cc/(card|hit)\.php"),"optimizely_skimmer_exfil", match(dest_host,"1688360\.cc"),"optimizely_payload_track_js", match(dest_host,"\.icu"),"ios_exploit_kit_router", match(dest_host,"webshell\.lol|linkforge\.cc"),"earlier_wave_injector", match(_raw,"136\.113\.106\.136|34\.96\.213\.201|34\.87\.36\.58"),"kit_ip", match(_raw,"_k7|__k7b|02111110|BIGNIAO"),"payload_marker", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(dest_host) as hosts by src, user, sourcetype
| sort - count
// Optimizely Web Experimentation injection (Nov 16, 2026): Report URI-published domains/IPs/markers. Search from Nov 13 to cover the earlier webshell.lol wave via Kissmetrics/StorifyMe/Minute Media. CSP violation reports (blocked_uri) count too.
let BadDomains = dynamic(["1688360.cc","5vobauua3ojpklx.icu","eil786npto9u5bq.icu","l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu","webshell.lol","linkforge.cc","je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu","q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu","ios-hack.icu","p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu","1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu","gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu"]);
let BadIPs = dynamic(["136.113.106.136", "34.96.213.201", "34.87.36.58"]);
let Since = datetime(2026-11-13);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where RemoteUrl has_any (BadDomains) or RemoteIP in (BadIPs) | extend Signal = iff(RemoteUrl has_any ("card.php", "hit.php"), "skimmer_exfil", "payload_or_kit_fetch"), Who = DeviceName, Evidence = strcat(RemoteUrl, " ", RemoteIP, " ", InitiatingProcessFileName)),
(DnsEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where Name has_any (BadDomains) | extend Signal = "dns_lookup", Who = ClientIP, Evidence = Name),
(CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where RequestURL has_any (BadDomains) or DestinationHostName has_any (BadDomains) or DestinationIP in (BadIPs) | extend Signal = "proxy_firewall", Who = SourceIP, Evidence = strcat(RequestURL, " ", DestinationHostName, " ", DestinationIP)),
(DeviceEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since | where ActionType has "SmartScreen" or ActionType has "BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl" | where RemoteUrl has_any (BadDomains) | extend Signal = "browser_url", Who = DeviceName, Evidence = RemoteUrl)
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Signals = make_set(Signal), Evidence = make_set(Evidence, 20) by Who
| order by Hits desc
// Optimizely Web Experimentation injection (Nov 16, 2026): Report URI-published attacker domains and kit IPs; any card.php/hit.php hit means data may have left a browser

See all hunt queries →

⏱ CISA deadline

Not in CISA KEV as of Nov 18, 2026.

Sources

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