Rackspace Spot breach: leaked credentials let attackers create pods and read Kubernetes Secrets in customer clusters
SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.
What happened
Rackspace told Rackspace Spot customers that "on 17 November 2026 (about 00:20-22:00 UTC), an unauthorized party used leaked credentials to access parts of Rackspace Spot," according to the customer notification obtained by BleepingComputer (Nov 21, 2026). Rackspace learned of the intrusion on November 18 from a customer report. With that access the attacker could act as a legitimate user in some customer organizations: create pods in Kubernetes clusters, read Kubernetes Secrets, and list nodes and volumes. Rackspace warns the attacker could have read any Secret in an affected user's clusters, plus any Spot API tokens or refresh tokens that user held. Rackspace says it revoked affected tokens and sessions, removed the unauthorized pods, rotated keys and strengthened access controls and monitoring. The Spot administration console was shut down for an extended period while the environment was cleaned (Platform9 co-founder Sirish Raghuram defended the decision on Reddit), and Rackspace said service was fully restored on November 21. Rackspace shared IOCs in the notice: IP 23.224.79.106, the range 23.224.0.0/15, and suspicious Kubernetes pod/object name prefixes i1, glm- and probe. UNKNOWN: how many customers were affected, whose credentials leaked and how, whether data was actually taken, and who the attacker is; Rackspace did not answer BleepingComputer's questions. No CVE is involved; the platform was accessed with valid but leaked credentials. For hunters: Barracuda's November 16 cloud-breach advisory also listed resource names made of the letter i plus digits (for example i28324probe), but no source has linked the two incidents.
Who's affected
Rackspace Spot customers who received the notification, and anything those customers' cluster Secrets unlock: databases, container registries, Git repositories, cloud storage, CI/CD and third-party SaaS. Because a stolen Secret works outside the cluster, abuse may show up in those downstream systems rather than in Spot.
✅ Fix / patch
- Reissue all Rackspace Spot API tokens and replace refresh tokens used in automation (Terraform, CI pipelines, scripts).
- Download fresh kubeconfig files and discard old ones.
- Rotate every credential stored in cluster Secrets at the source system (database passwords, cloud access keys, registry tokens, webhook and SaaS API keys), not just in Kubernetes.
- Check logs from November 17, 2026 onward in the systems those Secrets unlock (databases, container registries, Git, cloud storage, third-party services) for logins or API calls you can't explain, especially from 23.224.0.0/15.
- Look for pods and objects named with the prefixes i1, glm- or probe created around November 17 and delete anything you didn't create. Note that these prefixes can match legitimate names, so compare creation times and owners.
- Longer term: keep long-lived credentials out of Kubernetes Secrets where possible (external secrets managers, workload identity), enable encryption at rest for Secrets, and restrict who can create pods and read Secrets with RBAC.
🔎 Quick hunt check
Rackspace published one IP (23.224.79[.]106), a range (23.224.0[.]0/15) and pod/object name prefixes (i1, glm-, probe). The range is large and may include legitimate hosting customers, so treat hits as leads. Queries: (1) Kubernetes API audit events since November 17 that create pods/objects with those prefixes or read Secrets from the published range; (2) any authentication or API activity in downstream systems (cloud, Git, databases, VPN, SaaS) from 23.224.0.0/15 since November 17.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078, T1610, T1613, T1552.007
IOCs
- IP addresses:
23.224.79[.]106,23.224.0[.]0/15 (range named by Rackspace) - Files / paths:
Kubernetes pod/object name prefixes: i1, glm-, probe (may match legitimate names; check creation time around Nov 17, 2026)
Indicators from Rackspace's customer notification as published by BleepingComputer (Nov 21, 2026). No hashes or domains published. The /15 range covers many hosts; vet hits before blocking or escalating.
Hunt queries
Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.
```Rackspace Spot breach: k8s audit pods/objects named i1*/glm-*/probe* or Secret reads from 23.224.0.0/15, plus any downstream auth from that range since Nov 17 (Rackspace-published IOCs)```
index=* earliest=11/17/2026:00:00:00 (sourcetype=*kube*audit* OR sourcetype=*k8s*audit* OR sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail OR sourcetype=*azure*signin* OR sourcetype=*github*audit* OR tag=authentication OR tag=network)
| eval src_ip=coalesce(src_ip, src, 'sourceIPs{}', sourceIPAddress, ipAddress, actor_ip, ""), verb=coalesce(verb, action, eventName, ""), res=coalesce('objectRef.resource', object_resource, ""), obj=coalesce('objectRef.name', 'requestObject.metadata.name', object_name, "")
| eval from_range=if(cidrmatch("23.224.0.0/15", src_ip), 1, 0)
| eval hit=case(src_ip=="23.224.79.106", "rackspace_ioc_ip", match(obj, "^(i1|glm-|probe)") AND match(verb, "(?i)^(create|patch|update)$"), "suspicious_object_name", from_range==1 AND res=="secrets", "secret_read_from_range", from_range==1, "activity_from_range")
| where isnotnull(hit)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(verb) as actions values(res) as resources values(obj) as objects values(user) as users by hit, src_ip, sourcetype
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort hit - count// Rackspace Spot breach: Rackspace-published IP/range across sign-in, cloud and network logs + k8s audit objects named i1*/glm-*/probe* since Nov 17 (tune tables to what you ingest)
let Since = datetime(2026-11-17);
let IocIp = "23.224.79.106";
let IocRange = "23.224.0.0/15";
let NetHits = union isfuzzy=true
(SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated >= Since | project TimeGenerated, Table = "SigninLogs", Ip = IPAddress, Who = UserPrincipalName, What = AppDisplayName),
(AWSCloudTrail | where TimeGenerated >= Since | project TimeGenerated, Table = "AWSCloudTrail", Ip = SourceIpAddress, Who = UserIdentityArn, What = EventName),
(AzureActivity | where TimeGenerated >= Since | project TimeGenerated, Table = "AzureActivity", Ip = CallerIpAddress, Who = Caller, What = OperationNameValue),
(CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated >= Since | project TimeGenerated, Table = "CommonSecurityLog", Ip = SourceIP, Who = SourceUserName, What = Activity)
| where Ip == IocIp or ipv4_is_in_range(Ip, IocRange)
| extend Hit = iff(Ip == IocIp, "rackspace_ioc_ip", "activity_from_range");
let K8sHits = union isfuzzy=true (AKSAudit
| where TimeGenerated >= Since
| extend ObjName = tostring(ObjectRef.name), Res = tostring(ObjectRef.resource), Ip = tostring(SourceIps[0])
| where (Verb in ("create", "patch", "update") and ObjName matches regex @"^(i1|glm-|probe)") or (Res == "secrets" and ipv4_is_in_range(Ip, IocRange))
| project TimeGenerated, Table = "AKSAudit", Ip, Who = tostring(User.username), What = strcat(Verb, " ", Res, "/", ObjName), Hit = "k8s_audit_match");
union isfuzzy=true NetHits, K8sHits
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Actions = make_set(What, 25) by Hit, Table, Ip, Who
| order by Hit asc, Events desc⏱ CISA deadline
Not in CISA KEV as of Nov 22, 2026.
Sources
- BleepingComputer: Rackspace Spot breach let hackers access customer Kubernetes secrets (Nov 21, 2026; quotes Rackspace's customer notification and IOCs)
- Five Nines: Rackspace Spot breach gave attackers access to Kubernetes secrets (Nov 21, 2026)
Primary source note: Rackspace has not published a public statement or advisory; it notified affected Spot customers directly. Facts and IOCs come from that customer notification as obtained and published by BleepingComputer, and from Platform9 co-founder Sirish Raghuram's Reddit comments quoted there.
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