← All playbooks
HighBreach · 2026-11-17

RIKEN Fugaku supercomputer breach: intruder entered through the public status dashboard and took users' SSH keys and stored credentials

SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.

What happened

RIKEN disclosed on November 17, 2026 that an outside party got into the internal operations network of Fugaku, Japan's flagship supercomputer run by the RIKEN Center for Computational Science, between November 10 and 13 by way of the publicly accessible web dashboard that showed Fugaku's operating status. The exact method is still under investigation; RIKEN says it will fix the exploited software vulnerability before restarting. The intruder tampered with multiple internal servers, installed malicious programs, and took or may have taken files in users' home directories, including SSH private keys and access keys users had stored there for connecting to systems outside RIKEN, plus names, email addresses and user IDs from the authentication system: up to 4,222 Fugaku users and 375 users of the new RIKYU AI-for-Science supercomputer (4,597 people). RIKEN confirmed the intruder then tried to connect to other systems with some of the stolen credentials. It found no evidence so far that research data left the system. Suspicious traffic was spotted on November 12 by the outsourced maintenance provider, the access was confirmed on November 13, and RIKEN shut Fugaku down and cut external access at 4:30 AM JST on November 14, rotated admin keys, invalidated every user's login public key, and emailed users on November 15. No attribution has been made.

Who's affected

Fugaku and RIKYU users (researchers in academia and industry, Japan and abroad) and, more importantly for defenders, every external system where those users' keys or tokens are authorized: university clusters, HPCI centres, GitHub/GitLab, cloud accounts (AWS/Azure/GCP access keys), and corporate R&D systems. Organisations whose staff ran jobs on Fugaku should treat any credential stored in a Fugaku home directory as stolen.

✅ Fix / patch

  • Users: for every SSH private key that was stored on Fugaku, remove the matching public key from authorized_keys on every server and from GitHub/GitLab/Bitbucket and any other service, then generate a new key pair. Revoke and replace any other credential stored there (cloud access keys, API tokens, .netrc, git credentials, kubeconfigs).
  • Organisations: ask staff and collaborators whether they had Fugaku/RIKYU accounts, collect the fingerprints of keys they used there, and search authorized_keys across your estate for them (ssh-keygen -lf on each authorized_keys file) so they can be removed centrally.
  • Rotate cloud access keys tied to those users and review their activity since November 10.
  • Expect phishing that impersonates Fugaku, RIKEN or HPCI; RIKEN says it will never ask for passwords or personal information by email.

🔎 Quick hunt check

RIKEN has not published IPs, domains, hashes or the exploited software, so hunt for use of the stolen credentials. RIKEN confirmed the attacker tried to log in to other systems with them. From November 10, look for publickey SSH logins (Accepted publickey) for accounts belonging to Fugaku users or using their key fingerprints, from source IPs those users have never used, and for SSH failures followed by success; cloud API calls with those users' access keys from new IPs or user agents (sts:GetCallerIdentity first is a common key-validation step); and git pushes or clones with their SSH keys from unfamiliar networks. Build a watchlist of affected usernames or key fingerprints first, then run the queries below.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1190, T1552.004, T1552.001, T1005, T1021.004, T1078

IOCs

No IOCs (IPs, domains or hashes) published by the sources yet.

Hunt queries

Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.

```RIKEN Fugaku breach (Nov 10-13, 2026): stolen SSH keys / access keys reused elsewhere. Fill fugaku_users.csv (user, key_fingerprint) first.```
index=* earliest=11/10/2026:00:00:00
((sourcetype=linux_secure OR sourcetype=*sshd* OR sourcetype=syslog) "Accepted publickey") OR (sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail eventName=GetCallerIdentity)
| rex field=_raw "Accepted publickey for (?<ssh_user>\S+) from (?<ssh_src>\S+) port \d+ ssh2: \S+ (?<key_fp>SHA256:\S+)"
| eval user=coalesce(ssh_user, 'userIdentity.userName'), src=coalesce(ssh_src, sourceIPAddress)
| lookup fugaku_users.csv user OUTPUT user as watch_user
| lookup fugaku_users.csv key_fingerprint as key_fp OUTPUT key_fingerprint as watch_fp
| where isnotnull(watch_user) OR isnotnull(watch_fp)
| eval signal=if(isnotnull(key_fp), "ssh_publickey_login", "cloud_key_validation")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(host) as hosts values(key_fp) as fingerprints by user, src
| eventstats dc(src) as src_count by user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - first_seen
```New src values for a Fugaku user since Nov 10 = rotate that user's keys and investigate the session.```
// RIKEN Fugaku breach (Nov 10-13, 2026): stolen SSH keys / access keys reused elsewhere. Fill the watchlists first.
let Since = datetime(2026-11-10);
let FugakuUsers = dynamic(["user1","user2"]);          // affected usernames
let FugakuKeys = dynamic(["SHA256:REPLACE_ME"]);        // key fingerprints that lived on Fugaku
let Baseline = Syslog
 | where TimeGenerated between (ago(120d) .. Since)
 | where ProcessName == "sshd" and SyslogMessage has "Accepted publickey"
 | extend User = extract(@"for (\S+) from", 1, SyslogMessage), Src = extract(@"from (\S+) port", 1, SyslogMessage)
 | distinct User, Src;
union isfuzzy=true
(Syslog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where ProcessName == "sshd" and SyslogMessage has "Accepted publickey"
 | extend User = extract(@"for (\S+) from", 1, SyslogMessage), Src = extract(@"from (\S+) port", 1, SyslogMessage), Fp = extract(@"(SHA256:\S+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
 | where User in (FugakuUsers) or Fp in (FugakuKeys)
 | join kind=leftanti Baseline on User, Src
 | extend Signal = "ssh_login_new_source", Who = User, Evidence = strcat(Computer, " ", Src, " ", Fp)),
(AWSCloudTrail | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where UserIdentityUserName in (FugakuUsers)
 | summarize arg_min(TimeGenerated, EventName, UserAgent) by UserIdentityUserName, SourceIpAddress
 | extend Signal = "aws_key_use", Who = UserIdentityUserName, Evidence = strcat(SourceIpAddress, " ", EventName, " ", UserAgent))
| project TimeGenerated, Signal, Who, Evidence
| order by TimeGenerated asc

See all hunt queries →

⏱ CISA deadline

Not in CISA KEV as of Nov 18, 2026.

Sources

Related playbooks

Get the SockAnalyst Weekly Brief free, every Thursday.

One email a week with the KEV deadlines, patches and hunt queries that matter. New playbooks still post here on the site every morning.

Subscribe free

Read the free weekly pack →