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CriticalExploited vuln · 2026-11-20

VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890: Directory Service auth bypass exploited as a zero-day by China-nexus Armory Castle since September

SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.

What happened

On November 19, 2026, Broadcom published VMSA-2026-0009, fixing CVE-2026-123890 (CVSSv3 9.8, Critical), an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service (vmdird) of vCenter Server that lets anyone with network access to vCenter gain unauthorized access; Broadcom lists no workaround and credits Mandiant with the report. The same day Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant said the suspected PRC-nexus espionage group ARMORY CASTLE (formerly UNC5221) exploited it as a zero-day in early September 2026. The bug discloses the SRP-6a session key over DCE/RPC on TCP 2012, giving an authenticated session as [email protected]. ARMORY CASTLE got in through a BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day (CVE-2026-102764), moved to an internal Linux appliance with no EDR, then used a Go tool GTIG calls BONESAW to copy vCenter's directory database (/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb), steal the STS SAML signing key and create an SSO admin account, and SAWSNAKE to forge SAML logins (Golden SAML, which bypasses MFA). It then enabled SSH through the VAMI API, took the vCenter master key and PostgreSQL password file, reached ESXi as root and copied NTDS.dit and registry hives out of guest VM disks. GTIG says a small number of organizations are confirmed compromised. VMSA-2026-0009 also fixes four lower-severity SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows bugs (CVE-2026-123891 to -123894) with no reported exploitation.

Update (2026-11-21): Update Nov 21: CISA added CVE-2026-123890 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 20, 2026 (catalog 2026.11.20) with a November 23 federal due date and marked it as requiring forensic triage under BOD 26-04, so agencies must check vCenter for compromise, not only patch. Ransomware use is listed as unknown. Fixes are unchanged (8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200, 9.1.1.0200, VCF 5.2.5; vCenter 7.0 extended-support customers contact Broadcom).

Who's affected

Every organization running vCenter Server 7.0, 8.0, 9.0 or 9.1, including the vCenter builds inside VMware Cloud Foundation (5.x and 9.x), vSphere Foundation and Telco Cloud products, whether or not Enhanced Linked Mode is used. vCenter is normally internal, so the realistic risk is an attacker who already has any foothold that can reach vCenter's TCP 2012, as in this campaign. A compromised vCenter means control of every ESXi host and VM it manages, and the stolen SAML key keeps working after the patch unless it is rotated.

✅ Fix / patch

  • Patch now: vCenter 8.0 U3m; vCenter in VCF/vSphere Foundation 9.1.1.0200 or 9.0.2.0200; VCF 5.x to 5.2.5; Telco Cloud Platform/Infrastructure per KB463116. vCenter 7.0 is affected and has no public fix: contact Broadcom Support if you have extended support, otherwise plan the upgrade. Broadcom lists no workaround and calls this an emergency change.
  • Until patched, restrict vCenter's TCP 2012 (vmdird RPC), 389/636, 5480 (VAMI), 22 and 443 to the specific admin, backup and peer hosts that need them; GTIG's VCSA Hardening & Logging Tool enforces this with iptables and forwards denied connections to your SIEM (test it under change control first).
  • Because exploitation started in early September, assume compromise is possible if vCenter was reachable from any host an attacker could own: review vsphere.local for SSO admin or machine accounts you did not create, VAMI SSH enable/disable events, and unexpected root authorized_keys on ESXi hosts.
  • If you find compromise, patching is not enough: rotate the STS SAML signing certificate and vCenter certificates, reset [email protected] and vpxuser credentials, rotate the PostgreSQL credentials, and treat domain controllers on that cluster as exposed (NTDS.dit was taken in this campaign), which means a full krbtgt and privileged-password reset.

🔎 Quick hunt check

GTIG published file names, YARA rules and network IPs for this campaign (below); the IPs are suspected obfuscation-network addresses, so treat hits as leads. Behaviour to hunt: (1) any host other than known vCenter/PSC peers connecting to vCenter on TCP 2012, and internal nmap-style sweeps of ports 2012, 5480 and 9080; (2) VAMI PUT requests to /rest/appliance/access/ssh, especially SSH turned on and off again within minutes; (3) new vsphere.local SSO admin or machine accounts; (4) on Linux appliances: processes /tmp/123, /tmp/sss, /tmp/dbr (including 'dbr -R -p'), /usr/bin/vmtoolscs, gdb run with --command=/tmp/gdb_file, base64 decoding into /tmp, chmod u+s on /bin/env, and SUID set on env; (5) unexpected outbound HTTPS to slack.com from appliances (LAZYBONES uses Slack for C2); (6) ESXi root SSH/SCP sessions and new root authorized_keys entries.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1210, T1046, T1505.003, T1548.001, T1136.002, T1606.002, T1552.004, T1003.003, T1021.004, T1098.004, T1102.002, T1543.002, T1560.001, T1070.004

IOCs

  • IP addresses: 103.147.251[.]5, 103.190.38[.]3, 118.174.128[.]34, 118.174.128[.]36, 118.174.128[.]38, 176.9.89[.]66, 185.71.15[.]109, 220.121.128[.]41, 222.108.77[.]44, 61.216.56[.]127, 81.45.89[.]43
  • Files / paths: ActiveSer.jsp (SLIMSAVAGE web shell, secret pwd=123), u.jsp (CAGEMATCH staging web shell), /tmp/123 (BONESAW, CVE-2026-123890 exploit utility), /tmp/sss (SAWSNAKE SAML forging utility), /tmp/dbr (BEARBONES Dropbear-based SSH backdoor; seen listening on TCP 53 and 33992), /usr/bin/vmtoolscs (LAZYBONES Slack-C2 backdoor, systemd persistence), /tmp/123.key (SSH private key matching key added to ESXi root authorized_keys), /tmp/gdb_file (gdb script setting SUID on /bin/env)

From GTIG/Mandiant's Nov 19, 2026 report. All 11 IPs are labelled 'Suspected Obfuscation Network IP' (shared relay infrastructure, so expect possible noise). GTIG also publishes YARA rules (G_Hunting_Utility_BONESAW_2, SAWSNAKE_2, Webshell_SLIMSAVAGE_1, CAGEMATCH_1, Backdoor_BEARBONES_1, LAZYBONES_1) and fuller IOCs in a GTI Collection for registered users. Broadcom published no IOCs. No file hashes were published in the blog.

Hunt queries

Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.

```VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890 (Armory Castle): TCP 2012 from unexpected hosts, VAMI SSH toggling, BONESAW/SAWSNAKE/BEARBONES/LAZYBONES artifacts, GTIG IPs```
index=* earliest=08/01/2026:00:00:00
(dest_port=2012 OR dest_port=5480 OR dest_port=9080 OR "/rest/appliance/access/ssh" OR "/tmp/123" OR "/tmp/sss" OR "/tmp/dbr" OR "vmtoolscs" OR "gdb_file" OR "u+s /bin/env" OR "IWNobW9kIHUrcyAvYmluL2VudgpxCg==" OR "data.mdb" OR "slack.com" OR dest_ip IN ("103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36","118.174.128.38","176.9.89.66","185.71.15.109","220.121.128.41","222.108.77.44","61.216.56.127","81.45.89.43") OR src_ip IN ("103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36","118.174.128.38","176.9.89.66","185.71.15.109","220.121.128.41","222.108.77.44","61.216.56.127","81.45.89.43"))
| eval cmd=coalesce(process, CommandLine, cmdline, ""), uri=coalesce(uri_path, uri, url, ""), method=upper(coalesce(http_method, method, ""))
| eval signal=case(
    tonumber(dest_port)=2012, "vmdird_rpc_2012_connection",
    match(uri,"/rest/appliance/access/ssh") AND method="PUT", "vami_ssh_toggle",
    match(cmd,"(^|/|\s)(tmp/123|tmp/sss|tmp/dbr)(\s|$)|/usr/bin/vmtoolscs|dbr -R -p"), "armory_castle_tool_exec",
    match(cmd,"gdb .*--command=/tmp/gdb_file|chmod u\+s /bin/env|IWNobW9kIHUrcyAvYmluL2VudgpxCg=="), "suid_env_privesc",
    match(_raw,"/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data\.mdb") AND NOT match(lower(coalesce(process_name,"")),"vmdird"), "vmdir_db_access",
    match(_raw,"slack\.com") AND match(lower(host),"vcsa|vcenter|appliance|esx"), "appliance_to_slack",
    match(_raw,"103\.147\.251\.5|103\.190\.38\.3|118\.174\.128\.3[468]|176\.9\.89\.66|185\.71\.15\.109|220\.121\.128\.41|222\.108\.77\.44|61\.216\.56\.127|81\.45\.89\.43"), "gtig_network_ioc",
    tonumber(dest_port) IN (5480,9080), "vcenter_mgmt_port_contact",
    true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| eval who=coalesce(src_ip, src, host)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(dest) as dests values(cmd) as cmdlines values(uri) as uris by who
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
``` Allow-list your real vCenter/PSC peers, backup and admin jump hosts for the 2012/5480 signals before alerting ```
// VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890 (Armory Castle): vmdird RPC 2012 from unexpected hosts, VAMI SSH toggle, tool artifacts, GTIG IPs
let Since = datetime(2026-08-01);
let GtigIPs = dynamic(["103.147.251.5","103.190.38.3","118.174.128.34","118.174.128.36","118.174.128.38","176.9.89.66","185.71.15.109","220.121.128.41","222.108.77.44","61.216.56.127","81.45.89.43"]);
let KnownVcPeers = dynamic([]); // add your vCenter/PSC peer, backup and jump-host IPs
union isfuzzy=true
(CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where (DestinationPort in (2012, 5480, 9080) and not(SourceIP in (KnownVcPeers)))
    or (RequestURL has "/rest/appliance/access/ssh" and RequestMethod =~ "PUT")
    or SourceIP in (GtigIPs) or DestinationIP in (GtigIPs)
 | extend Signal = case(DestinationPort == 2012, "vmdird_rpc_2012_connection", RequestURL has "/rest/appliance/access/ssh", "vami_ssh_toggle", SourceIP in (GtigIPs) or DestinationIP in (GtigIPs), "gtig_network_ioc", "vcenter_mgmt_port_contact"), Who = SourceIP, Evidence = strcat(DestinationIP, ":", tostring(DestinationPort), " ", RequestURL)),
(DeviceNetworkEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where (RemotePort == 2012 and not(RemoteIP in (KnownVcPeers))) or RemoteIP in (GtigIPs) or LocalPort == 33992
 | extend Signal = iff(RemoteIP in (GtigIPs), "gtig_network_ioc", iff(LocalPort == 33992, "bearbones_listener_port", "vmdird_rpc_2012_connection")), Who = DeviceName, Evidence = strcat(RemoteIP, ":", tostring(RemotePort), " ", InitiatingProcessCommandLine)),
(DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where FolderPath in ("/tmp/123", "/tmp/sss", "/tmp/dbr", "/usr/bin/vmtoolscs")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/tmp/gdb_file", "chmod u+s /bin/env", "IWNobW9kIHUrcyAvYmluL2VudgpxCg==", "dbr -R -p", "/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb", "vmfs_browser.py")
 | extend Signal = "armory_castle_tool_exec", Who = DeviceName, Evidence = ProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceFileEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where FileName in ("ActiveSer.jsp", "u.jsp") or FolderPath in ("/tmp/123", "/tmp/sss", "/tmp/dbr", "/usr/bin/vmtoolscs", "/tmp/123.key", "/tmp/123.rar")
 | extend Signal = "gtig_file_ioc", Who = DeviceName, Evidence = FolderPath),
(Syslog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where SyslogMessage has_any ("/rest/appliance/access/ssh", "vmfs_browser.py", "/tmp/dbr", "o.tar.gz")
 | extend Signal = "vcsa_esxi_syslog", Who = HostName, Evidence = SyslogMessage)
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Signals = make_set(Signal), Evidence = make_set(Evidence, 20) by Who
| order by Hits desc

See all hunt queries →

⏱ CISA deadline

CVE-2026-123890CVSS 9.8 Critical (v3.1, CNA)
--
Federal due 2026-11-23 · CISA KEV catalog

Sources

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