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HighExploited vuln · 2026-11-21

SAP NetWeaver Enterprise Portal CVE-2025-42884: year-old unauthenticated JNDI injection now exploited, CISA KEV deadline Nov 23

SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.

What happened

SAP fixed CVE-2025-42884 on its November 11, 2025 Security Patch Day in SAP Security Note 3660969: SAP NetWeaver Enterprise Portal lets an unauthenticated attacker inject JNDI environment properties or pass a URL used during JNDI lookup operations, so the portal talks to an unintended JNDI provider. SAP rates it CVSS 3.1 6.5 (Medium; AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N), with disclosure or modification of server information and no availability impact. On November 20, 2026, CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with a November 23 federal due date; CISA has published no details of the attacks, and ransomware use is listed as unknown. The same day, Onapsis Research Labs, which reported the flaw to SAP on August 18, 2025 and scored it CVSS 10.0 at the time, published its full advisory (ONAPSIS-2026-0100): unprotected SOAP operations in an AS Java endpoint let a remote unauthenticated attacker control the environment properties of a JNDI lookup, bypass the platform's JNDI restrictions and make the server contact an attacker-operated RMI registry that returns a malicious serialized Java object over JRMP. Onapsis says deserializing that object can lead to remote code execution if a usable gadget chain is present and not blocked by a deserialization filter; otherwise the impact is limited to confidentiality and integrity. Onapsis notes this is one of several JNDI issues, authenticated and unauthenticated, fixed by the same note. Neither SAP nor CISA has named attackers or victims.

Who's affected

Organizations running SAP NetWeaver Enterprise Portal 7.50 (EP-BASIS / EP-RUNTIME) on AS Java that have not applied SAP Note 3660969 since November 2025. Enterprise Portal is often the internet-facing front door to an SAP landscape (supplier, employee and partner portals). SAP's note covers the portal components; ABAP-only systems and S/4HANA without the Java portal are not listed as affected.

✅ Fix / patch

  • Apply SAP Security Note 3660969 (November 2025 Patch Day) to every Enterprise Portal / AS Java system, including test, DR and partner-facing instances. SAP lists no workaround. Onapsis also recommends the hardening in SAP Security Note 3660659.
  • Because the patch has been available for a year and exploitation is now confirmed, check whether unpatched portals were already hit before you call them clean: review HTTP access logs on the portal for unauthenticated SOAP requests carrying JNDI URLs (ldap://, rmi://, iiop://, dns://) or java.naming.* properties, and look for outbound connections from AS Java hosts to unknown RMI or LDAP servers.
  • Restrict egress from SAP Java application servers: they should not open RMI (1099 and other registry ports), LDAP (389/636) or IIOP connections to the internet. Blocking that egress breaks the attacker-operated RMI registry path Onapsis describes.
  • Limit portal exposure: put internet-facing Enterprise Portals behind a reverse proxy or WAF that blocks unauthenticated access to SOAP/web-service endpoints that are not needed externally, and keep the AS Java management interfaces internal.

🔎 Quick hunt check

No IOCs have been published by SAP, CISA or Onapsis. Hunt the behaviour Onapsis describes: (1) unauthenticated HTTP requests to the portal whose URL or body contains JNDI URLs (ldap://, rmi://, iiop://, dns://, including URL-encoded forms) or java.naming.provider.url / java.naming.factory.initial; (2) SAP AS Java hosts initiating outbound connections to internet addresses on RMI (1099) or LDAP (389/636) ports, which they normally never do; (3) shells or scripting interpreters spawned by the AS Java server process (jstart / jstart.exe), the post-exploitation sign if a deserialization gadget chain gave code execution.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1190, T1082, T1059

IOCs

No IOCs (IPs, domains or hashes) published by the sources yet.

Hunt queries

Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.

```SAP NetWeaver Portal CVE-2025-42884: JNDI injection strings in portal requests, AS Java egress to RMI/LDAP, shells spawned by jstart```
index=* earliest=-90d
((sourcetype=*access* OR sourcetype=*sap* OR sourcetype=*waf* OR tag=web) ("ldap:" OR "rmi:" OR "iiop:" OR "dns:" OR "java.naming" OR "ldap%3A" OR "rmi%3A"))
OR (dest_port IN (1099,389,636))
OR (parent_process_name IN ("jstart","jstart.exe") OR ParentImage="*jstart*")
| eval sap_java_hosts="10.0.0.21,10.0.0.22" ``` replace with your Enterprise Portal / AS Java server IPs ```
| eval src_x=coalesce(src_ip, src, ""), dst_x=coalesce(dest_ip, dest, ""), dport=tonumber(dest_port), req=urldecode(coalesce(uri, url, uri_query, _raw)), child=lower(coalesce(process_name, Image, ""))
| eval src_is_sap=if(like(",".sap_java_hosts.",", "%,".src_x.",%"),1,0)
| eval signal=case(
    match(req,"(?i)(ldap|rmi|iiop|dns)://|java\.naming\.(provider\.url|factory\.initial)"), "jndi_injection_string_in_request",
    src_is_sap=1 AND (dport=1099 OR dport=389 OR dport=636) AND NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",dst_x) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",dst_x) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",dst_x), "sap_java_egress_rmi_ldap",
    match(child,"(sh|bash|dash|cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh|python[0-9.]*|perl|curl|wget)$"), "shell_spawned_by_jstart",
    true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(dst_x) as dests values(dport) as ports values(req) as requests values(child) as children by src_x, host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
// SAP NetWeaver Portal CVE-2025-42884: JNDI strings in portal requests, AS Java egress to RMI/LDAP, shells spawned by jstart
let Since = ago(90d);
let SapJavaHosts = dynamic(["10.0.0.21","10.0.0.22"]); // replace with your Enterprise Portal / AS Java IPs
let JndiRegex = @"(?i)(ldap|rmi|iiop|dns)(://|%3a%2f%2f)|java\.naming\.(provider\.url|factory\.initial)";
union isfuzzy=true
(W3CIISLog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | extend Req = strcat(csUriStem, "?", csUriQuery) | where Req matches regex JndiRegex
 | extend Signal = "jndi_injection_string_in_request", Who = cIP, Evidence = Req),
(AzureDiagnostics | where TimeGenerated >= Since and Category in ("ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog","ApplicationGatewayAccessLog","FrontDoorWebApplicationFirewallLog")
 | extend Req = coalesce(requestUri_s, details_data_s) | where Req matches regex JndiRegex
 | extend Signal = "jndi_injection_string_in_request", Who = clientIp_s, Evidence = Req),
(CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where (RequestURL matches regex JndiRegex)
    or (SourceIP in (SapJavaHosts) and DestinationPort in (1099, 389, 636) and not(ipv4_is_private(DestinationIP)))
 | extend Signal = iff(RequestURL matches regex JndiRegex, "jndi_injection_string_in_request", "sap_java_egress_rmi_ldap"), Who = SourceIP, Evidence = coalesce(RequestURL, strcat(DestinationIP, ":", tostring(DestinationPort)))),
(DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("jstart","jstart.exe")
 | where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","dash","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh","python","python3","perl","curl","wget")
 | extend Signal = "shell_spawned_by_jstart", Who = DeviceName, Evidence = ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Signals = make_set(Signal), Evidence = make_set(Evidence, 20) by Who
| order by Hits desc

See all hunt queries →

⏱ CISA deadline

CVE-2025-42884CVSS 6.5 Medium (v3.1, CNA)
--
Federal due 2026-11-23 · CISA KEV catalog

Sources

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