Puppet Enterprise CVE-2026-115731: crafted agent report runs code on the Puppet Server, exploited (CISA KEV)
SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.
What happened
CISA added CVE-2026-115731 in Perforce Puppet Enterprise to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17, 2026, with a federal due date of December 1, 2026. The flaw is a deserialization of untrusted data bug (CWE-502/CWE-94) in Puppet's report-processing code: a client holding any CA-signed agent certificate can PUT a report containing a crafted rich-data type and make the Puppet Server execute arbitrary code as its service user. Red Hat describes the root cause as unsafe instantiation of untrusted __ptype rich-data types during report deserialization. If the Puppet CA autosigns certificate requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated attacker on the network can first get a valid certificate. Because the Puppet Server is the CA and pushes configuration to every managed machine, Red Hat warns a compromise can extend to the CA and all downstream systems. Perforce shipped fixes in early November together with a second critical bug, CVE-2026-115732 (a certificate-name authorization bypass that lets a colliding certname impersonate another node). The OSG security team notes public proof-of-concept details exist. CISA lists ransomware use as unknown; no attacker, IOCs or victim counts have been published.
Who's affected
Anyone running Puppet Enterprise before 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1; open-source Puppet Server / Puppet Core before Puppet Server 9.0.24.1 (Puppet Core 9.1.3); OpenVox Server 8.17.0 and earlier or 9.1.0 and earlier; and Red Hat Satellite, which processes client reports by default. Highest risk: Puppet Servers reachable from untrusted networks and any CA with naive or blanket autosigning.
✅ Fix / patch
- Upgrade now: Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 or 2023.8.13; Puppet Core 9.1.3 (ships Puppet Server 9.0.24.1); OpenVox Server/OpenVoxDB 8.18.0 or 9.2.0 (OpenVox Agent 8.32.0/9.3.0). Debian 13 users: DSA-6608-1 (puppet-agent 8.10.0-5+deb13u1). Satellite users: follow Red Hat's errata for CVE-2026-115731.
- Until patched, turn off autosigning or require strong verification (policy-based autosign with a pre-shared secret), and do not approve CSRs whose names are prefixes or suffixes of existing certnames (CVE-2026-115732).
- Restrict TCP 8140 on Puppet Servers/compilers to your agent networks only.
- Treat an exposed, unpatched server as possibly compromised: run puppetserver ca list --all and revoke certificates you cannot tie to a real node, review stored reports and the puppetserver access log for report PUTs from unknown certnames, and check for unexpected processes, cron jobs, code in your control repo or new classes pushed to nodes.
- Federal agencies: remediate by Dec 1, 2026 per CISA KEV / BOD 26-04.
🔎 Quick hunt check
No IOCs have been published by Perforce, CISA or Red Hat. Hunt the exploit path: report submissions (PUT /puppet/v3/report/<certname>) from certnames that are not in your node inventory or were signed only recently, certificate signings you cannot explain (especially autosigned ones), and the puppetserver JVM (java running as the puppet or pe-puppet user) spawning shells, curl/wget, python or base64. Baseline first: legitimate setups can run autosign policy scripts or external commands from the server. If report bodies are stored (reportdir or PuppetDB), look for rich-data __ptype entries naming unexpected Ruby/Puppet types in reports from suspicious certnames. Search from October 1, before the fix shipped.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1190, T1078, T1059.004, T1072
IOCs
No IOCs (IPs, domains or hashes) published by the sources yet.
Hunt queries
Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.
```Puppet CVE-2026-115731 (CISA KEV Nov 17, 2026): report PUTs and cert signings by certname, plus the puppetserver JVM spawning shells```
index=* earliest=10/01/2026:00:00:00
(source=*puppetserver* OR sourcetype=*puppet* OR "/puppet/v3/report/" OR "Signed certificate request" OR parent_process_name=java)
| rex field=_raw "\"PUT /puppet/v3/report/(?<report_certname>[^?\s\"]+)"
| rex field=_raw "(?i)Signed certificate request for (?<signed_cert>\S+)"
| eval child=lower(coalesce(process_name,"")), runas=lower(coalesce(user,""))
| eval signal=case(
isnotnull(report_certname), "report_put",
isnotnull(signed_cert), "cert_signed",
lower(coalesce(parent_process_name,""))="java" AND match(runas,"^(pe-)?puppet$") AND match(child,"^(sh|bash|dash|curl|wget|python3?|perl|nc|ncat|socat|base64)$"), "puppetserver_spawned_shell",
true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| eval certname=coalesce(report_certname, signed_cert, "(process event)"), client=coalesce(src, clientip, src_ip)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(client) as clients values(process) as cmdlines by host, certname
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - first_seen
```Compare certnames against your node inventory: new certnames that were signed recently AND submitted reports, or any puppetserver_spawned_shell row, need review.```// Puppet CVE-2026-115731 (CISA KEV Nov 17, 2026): unknown certnames submitting reports, new cert signings, puppetserver JVM spawning shells
let Since = datetime(2026-10-01);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "java" and InitiatingProcessAccountName in~ ("puppet","pe-puppet")
| where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","dash","curl","wget","python","python3","perl","nc","ncat","socat","base64")
| extend Signal = "puppetserver_spawned_shell", Who = DeviceName, Certname = "", Detail = ProcessCommandLine),
(Syslog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
| where SyslogMessage has "/puppet/v3/report/" or SyslogMessage has "Signed certificate request"
| extend Certname = coalesce(extract(@"PUT /puppet/v3/report/([^?\s""]+)", 1, SyslogMessage), extract(@"Signed certificate request for (\S+)", 1, SyslogMessage))
| extend Signal = iff(SyslogMessage has "/puppet/v3/report/", "report_put", "cert_signed"), Who = Computer, Detail = SyslogMessage)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Signals = make_set(Signal), Details = make_set(Detail, 10) by Who, Certname
| order by FirstSeen desc
// Review certnames not in your inventory that were signed recently and submitted reports, and every puppetserver_spawned_shell row⏱ CISA deadline
Sources
- CISA: CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog (Nov 17, 2026)
- Perforce: CVE-2026-115731 Report Deserialization Code Execution
- Puppet: What's New, PE 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 and 2023.8.13 security update
- Puppet Server release notes (9.0.24.1)
- Red Hat: CVE-2026-115731
- OSG Security: OSG-SEC-2026-11-06 Puppet Server vulnerabilities CVE-2026-115731 and CVE-2026-115732
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