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CriticalPatch · 2026-11-17

Oracle Java / OpenJDK CVE-2026-114938: Java4Shell Base64 decoder heap overflow allows pre-auth RCE on AVX-512 VBMI x86-64 servers

SockAnalyst · Security+ certified analyst.

What happened

On November 17, 2026, Oracle and the OpenJDK Vulnerability Group fixed CVE-2026-114938, nicknamed Java4Shell, and CISA issued an alert the same day urging organizations to patch immediately. The bug is a heap out-of-bounds write in the hand-written AVX-512 VBMI code (a HotSpot intrinsic) that speeds up java.util.Base64 decoding on x86-64 CPUs. A malformed Base64 value whose final fragment is only padding (Calif's trigger is 64 'A' characters followed by a single '='; 128 'A's plus '=' on older 17.x builds) makes the routine compute a negative output length, and a full 64-byte masked store then writes 62 bytes past the end of the destination array. Java throws an exception afterwards, but neighbouring heap objects are already corrupted. Calif, which found the flaw with AI-assisted auditing, says it reached unauthenticated remote code execution in default configurations of Keycloak, Atlassian Jira and Confluence, JFrog Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate, post-auth RCE in Kafka, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit and Spinnaker, a Heartbleed-style memory leak, and a client-side exploit against Java programs that connect to a malicious TLS server. Datadog Security Labs cautions that crashing the JVM (denial of service) is the easier outcome and that reliable RCE has to be tailored to each application and JVM; there is no universal exploit. Oracle and OpenJDK score it CVSS 3.1 8.1 (AC:H); Calif scores it CVSS 4.0 9.2, and Red Hat's preliminary score is 9.8. Oracle's November 2026 Critical Security Patch Update fixes it. As of the morning of November 18 it is still not in CISA's KEV catalog and no in-the-wild exploitation has been reported; Check Point says the triggering input had been publicly visible since September 9, 2026, and Immersive's Kevin Breen says he built a working (unreleased) exploit.

Update (2026-11-18): Update Nov 18: Re-checked the morning of Nov 18 (CT): CVE-2026-114938 is still not in CISA's KEV catalog (latest catalog 2026.11.17) and no in-the-wild exploitation has been reported. Fix status: Oracle fixed builds end in .1 (17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1, 27.0.1.1; 8u513 for the perf build per Sysdig); Amazon Corretto 17.0.21.1.2 and 21.0.13.1.2 shipped Nov 17; Debian has fixed packages only in unstable; Ubuntu lists all openjdk packages as 'Needs evaluation'; Red Hat errata and Eclipse Temurin builds are still pending. Red Hat's preliminary CVSS 3.0 score is 9.8 (Oracle/OpenJDK 8.1). New hunt signals added: the 'Input byte array has wrong 4-byte ending unit' exception and malformed Base64 tokens of 32+ characters; search window widened to September 9, 2026, when Check Point says a triggering input first became public. Avoid -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock without -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions: the JVM will not start.

Who's affected

Any Java service running OpenJDK-based Java 17.0.6 or later, 21, 25 or 27 on an x86-64 CPU with AVX-512 VBMI (Intel Ice Lake, Sapphire Rapids, Emerald Rapids, Granite Rapids; AMD Zen 4, Zen 5, Zen 6), including cloud instance families such as AWS C6i/M6i/R6i and C7i/M7i/R7a, GCP C3/C3D/C4/C4D/N4/N4D/M3/M4 and Azure D-series v5 to v7 (Red Hat's list). Affected distributions named by Calif: Oracle Java SE, Oracle OpenJDK, Oracle GraalVM for JDK, Amazon Corretto, Eclipse Temurin, Microsoft Build of OpenJDK, Azul Zulu, BellSoft Liberica, SAP SapMachine and Red Hat OpenJDK (RHEL 8, 9, 10 and anything built on RHEL/UBI images). Oracle also lists its Java SE 8u511b33-perf build and Oracle GraalVM for JDK 17.0.21.0.3 / 21.0.13.0.3. The CPU must expose avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi and bmi2 (Calif); a cloud resize can silently move a workload onto an affected CPU. Not affected: standard Java 8 and 11, native ARM64 JVMs, and x86-64 CPUs without AVX-512 VBMI. The app must also pass attacker-controlled Base64 to Base64.getDecoder() or getUrlDecoder(); HTTP Basic credentials, SAML messages, CSRF tokens and MIME encoded words are common paths and are often decoded before login.

✅ Fix / patch

  • Inventory first: on each Linux host run java -version (and check the runtime bundled inside each product and container image, not just the one on your PATH) plus grep -o avx512vbmi /proc/cpuinfo | head -1 (Red Hat). Empty output means the CPU lacks AVX-512 VBMI and is not known to be affected. Calif's stricter check: grep -m1 '^flags' /proc/cpuinfo | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^(avx512f|avx512bw|avx512vbmi|bmi2)$' must print all four flags. For a running process, jcmd <PID> VM.version shows the runtime actually in use.
  • Patch: Oracle fixed builds are 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 and 27.0.1.1 (only Oracle builds ending in .1 are patched), plus 8u513 for the 8u511b33-perf build (per Sysdig). Fix status checked the morning of Nov 18: Amazon Corretto 17.0.21.1.2 and 21.0.13.1.2 shipped Nov 17; Debian has fixed packages only in unstable (sid), with bookworm and trixie still listed vulnerable; Ubuntu lists every openjdk package as 'Needs evaluation'; Red Hat errata are still pending (RHSB-2026-018: fixes being expedited); Eclipse Temurin's latest builds are still 17.0.21+9 / 21.0.13+9 / 25.0.5+8 (no fix yet); Check Point lists Azul Zulu as shipped and Microsoft and Liberica as unconfirmed, so check each vendor's page. Rebuild and redeploy container images after updating base images, then restart every Java process.
  • If you cannot patch now: start x86-64 JVMs with -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics (Red Hat's preferred, narrower workaround) or -XX:UseAVX=2. Apply UseAVX=2 only to x86-64 hosts: native ARM64 JVMs do not recognise it and will fail to start. Do not use -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock on its own; without -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions the JVM will not start (Sysdig, Check Point). Confirm with jcmd <PID> VM.flags -all that UseBASE64Intrinsics = false or UseAVX = 2, and remove the flag once patched.
  • Prioritise internet-facing SSO/IdP and auth services (Keycloak, PingFederate), Atlassian, Jenkins, Artifactory and anything that decodes HTTP Basic or SAML before authentication. Products that bundle their own JVM should be fixed or flagged through the product vendor's supported path.
  • CISA's interim controls: validate and size-limit Base64 input at the application boundary and limit unauthenticated access until patched.

🔎 Quick hunt check

No IOCs (IPs, domains or hashes) have been published and no in-the-wild exploitation was reported as of the morning of Nov 18, so hunt for behaviour. The published trigger is a Base64 value made of a long run of 'A's ending in a lone '=' (valid padded Base64 is always a multiple of 4 characters; Sysdig suggests flagging Base64-alphabet tokens of 32+ characters that end in '=' with a length that is not a multiple of 4). Look for (1) JVM crashes: new hs_err_pid*.log files, SIGSEGV, 'A fatal error has been detected by the Java Runtime Environment', crashes during garbage collection, or bursts of worker restarts on one internet-facing app, since DoS is the easier outcome and failed exploit attempts crash; (2) application-log bursts of 'IllegalArgumentException: Input byte array has wrong 4-byte ending unit' from one source (Sysdig saw it on every attempt in tests); (3) a java process spawning a shell, curl/wget, python or a reverse-shell tool; (4) malformed Base64 in Authorization: Basic headers or SAMLResponse values where your WAF, reverse proxy or API gateway logs them (most access logs do not record the Authorization header). Check Point says a triggering input has been public since September 9, 2026, so search back to then.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1190, T1203, T1059.004, T1499.004

IOCs

No IOCs (IPs, domains or hashes) published by the sources yet.

Hunt queries

Starting points built only from published indicators. Field names vary; tune before use.

```Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938: JVM crashes, java spawning shells, and malformed Base64 in Basic auth (published trigger = run of 'A's + lone '=')```
index=* earliest=09/09/2026:00:00:00
("A fatal error has been detected by the Java Runtime Environment" OR "hs_err_pid" OR "wrong 4-byte ending unit" OR parent_process_name IN ("java","java.exe","javaw.exe") OR "Authorization: Basic" OR http_authorization=* OR cs_authorization=* OR "SAMLResponse")
| rex field=_raw "(?i)Authorization:\s*Basic\s+(?<raw_b64>[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)"
| eval auth=coalesce(http_authorization, cs_authorization, "")
| eval b64=coalesce(raw_b64, if(match(auth,"(?i)^Basic\s+"), replace(auth,"(?i)^Basic\s+",""), null()))
| eval child=lower(coalesce(process_name, ""))
| eval signal=case(
    match(_raw,"A fatal error has been detected by the Java Runtime Environment|hs_err_pid"), "jvm_crash",
    match(_raw,"Input byte array has wrong 4-byte ending unit"), "base64_decode_exception",
    match(lower(coalesce(parent_process_name,"")),"^javaw?(\.exe)?$") AND match(child,"^(sh|bash|dash|zsh|curl|wget|python3?|perl|nc|ncat|socat|cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)$"), "java_spawned_shell",
    isnotnull(b64) AND match(b64,"A{60,}="), "java4shell_trigger_pattern",
    isnotnull(b64) AND len(b64)>=32 AND len(b64)%4!=0 AND match(b64,"=$"), "malformed_basic_b64",
    match(_raw,"SAMLResponse=[A-Za-z0-9%+/]*A{60,}(=|%3D)"), "saml_trigger_pattern",
    true(), null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| eval client=coalesce(src, clientip, src_ip, c_ip)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(client) as clients values(process) as cmdlines by host, sourcetype
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count
// Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938: JVM crashes, java spawning shells, malformed Base64 (published trigger = run of 'A's + lone '=')
let Since = datetime(2026-09-09);
let Shells = dynamic(["sh","bash","dash","zsh","curl","wget","python","python3","perl","nc","ncat","socat","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java","java.exe","javaw.exe") and FileName in~ (Shells)
 | extend Signal = "java_spawned_shell", Who = DeviceName, Evidence = ProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceFileEvents | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where FileName startswith "hs_err_pid" and FileName endswith ".log"
 | extend Signal = "jvm_crash_file", Who = DeviceName, Evidence = strcat(FolderPath, " by ", InitiatingProcessFileName)),
(Syslog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where SyslogMessage has "A fatal error has been detected by the Java Runtime Environment" or SyslogMessage has "hs_err_pid"
 | extend Signal = "jvm_crash_log", Who = Computer, Evidence = SyslogMessage),
(Syslog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where SyslogMessage has "Input byte array has wrong 4-byte ending unit"
 | extend Signal = "base64_decode_exception", Who = Computer, Evidence = SyslogMessage),
(CommonSecurityLog | where TimeGenerated >= Since
 | where RequestURL matches regex @"A{60,}(=|%3D)" or AdditionalExtensions matches regex @"(?i)basic\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]*A{60,}="
 | extend Signal = "waf_proxy_trigger_pattern", Who = SourceIP, Evidence = strcat(DestinationHostName, " ", RequestURL))
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Signals = make_set(Signal), Evidence = make_set(Evidence, 20) by Who
| order by Hits desc

See all hunt queries →

⏱ CISA deadline

Not in CISA KEV as of Nov 18, 2026.

Sources

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